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International considerations are coming to play an increasingly impor- 
tant role in U.S. tax policy debates. Policy discussions of tax provisions 
bearing on foreign investment in the United States and American in- 
vestment abroad has long focused on the competitiveness question. 
Recently, reductions in taxes on business investments have been ad- 
vocated on the grounds that they will increase American competitive- 
ness. Excessive tax burdens are frequently blamed for the poor inter- 
national  performance  of  some  American  industries.  Indeed,  the 
President’s Commission on International Competitiveness recently urged 
business tax relief as a major element in a strategy directed at improving 
the trade position of the United States. Tax increases to reduce looming 
budget deficits are often defended on the grounds that they will reduce 
trade deficits. 
While economists have long recognized that increased international 
competitiveness is not necessarily a good thing, because it is the mirror 
image of a decline in a nation’s terms of trade, it is nonetheless an 
important policy goal. An  analysis of the interrelationships between 
tax policy and competitiveness therefore seems worthwhile. This paper 
provides such an analysis, stressing the crucial role of capital mobility 
in determining the impact of tax reforms on an economy’s traded-goods 
sector. I begin by examining theoretically the relationship between tax 
changes and competitiveness under various assumptions about inter- 
national capital mobility. Finding the conclusions sensitive to assump- 
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tions about capital mobility, I go on to consider empirically the extent 
of  international capital mobility. Drawing on both the theoretical and 
empirical analysis, I attempt to assess the likely impact of alternative 
tax reforms on international competitiveness. 
The common assumption that capital flows freely internationally leads 
to striking conclusions regarding the effects of tax policies. Tax mea- 
sures which stimulate investment but do not affect savings will  inevi- 
tably lead to declines in international competitiveness as long as capital 
is freely mobile internationally. The economic mechanism is simple. 
Measures which promote investment attract funds from abroad leading 
to an appreciation in  the real  exchange rate  and a reduction in  the 
competitiveness of domestic industry. The accounting identity holding 
that the current account equals the difference between national savings 
and national investment, insures that increases in  investment ceteris 
paribus  will be associated with decreases in the trade balance. Con- 
versely, tax policies which promote savings but do not have a direct 
impact on investment will improve trade performance. 
These results challenge the commonly expressed view that reduc- 
tions in tax burdens on business will improve competitiveness by en- 
abling them to undertake more productivity-enhancing investment. They 
also raise an interesting question in political economy. Why do firms 
in the traded-goods sector, whose competitiveness will be hurt by the 
capital inflows associated with investment incentives, lobby in favor 
of  them? Consideration of  this question leads naturally to an exami- 
nation of the premise of free international capital mobility that underlies 
the arguments in the previous paragraph. If capital is not internationally 
mobile,  stimulus  to investment  will  not  lead to capital inflows and 
therefore will not be associated with trade-balance deterioration. 
While there certainly is a large pool of internationally mobile capital, 
Feldstein and Horioka (1980) and Feldstein (1983) have pointed out an 
important puzzle raised by the hypothesis of perfect international cap- 
ital mobility. This hypothesis would predict that there should be no 
systematic relationship between domestic saving and investment rates, 
since capital can flow freely. Yet across the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) nations there is a very strong 
positive correlation between savings and investment rates. Over long 
periods of time, cumulative current-account deficits or surpluses are 
quite small despite large variations in domestic savings rates. On a very 
consistent basis, high-savings countries are also high-investment coun- 
tries, while low-savings countries, like the United  States, have rela- 
tively low rates of investment. 
The  observation  that  domestic  savings and investment  rates  are 
strongly associated can be interpreted as suggesting that tax policies 
which raise savings are likely to increase domestic investment signif- 351  Tax  Policy and International Competitiveness 
icantly. Similarly, policies directed at investment are unlikely to lead 
to permanent increases in investment unless domestic savings are in- 
creased as well. Alternatively, as many international economists argue, 
the cross-sectional correlation between national savings and investment 
rates may be a statistical artifact that does not call into question the 
international mobility of capital. Resolving the issue requires that some 
interpretation of the close cross-sectional linkages between national 
savings and investment be provided. 
I consider three alternative hypotheses regarding the apparent in- 
ternational immobility of capital. The first is the hypothesis advanced 
by Feldstein and Horioka that institutional and legal restrictions of a 
variety of types preclude substantial international  capital flows. The 
second is a possibility advanced by Obstfeld (1985), among others, that 
the high correlation between domestic savings and investment rates is 
an artifact of common factors, such as high population growth, that 
affect both savings and investment. The third hypothesis is that capital 
is mobile internationally, but that countries systematically utilize eco- 
nomic policy tools in an effort to achieve approximate current-account 
balance, so that large, sustained capital flows are not observed. My 
conclusion is that the third hypothesis provides the most satisfactory 
available explanation for the observed correlations between domestic 
savings and investment rates. I suggest several reasons why countries 
might find it desirable to maintain external balance. 
This conclusion raises an important question. Given that policies to 
limit net capital mobility are frequently pursued, how should the effects 
of tax policy reforms which affect savings or investment be evaluated? 
If  no other policy measures are undertaken, their effects should be 
analyzed under the assumption that capital is perfectly mobile. But the 
historical record suggests that current-account imbalances are likely to 
be offset by other policy actions. Both these issues have obvious rel- 
evance to the current American situation, where business tax reduc- 
tions appear to have stimulated a significant amount of capital forma- 
tion, and to have drawn capital in from abroad in large quantity, but 
where the trade deficit is seen as a major problem. 
The paper is organized as follows. The first section examines theo- 
retically the effects of alternative tax policies on competitiveness under 
different assumptions about international capital mobility. It suggests 
some possible explanations for the paradox that firms in traded-goods 
industries frequently support tax policies that seem likely to reduce 
competitiveness. The second section takes up the question of the extent 
of international capital mobility and documents the very high corre- 
lation between domestic savings and investment rates across the OECD 
nations. The third section considers alternative hypotheses regarding 
this phenomenon and concludes  that  it is most likely the result of 352  Lawrence H. Summers 
national economic policies directed at maintaining external balance. 
Possible reasons why nations might pursue such policies are consid- 
ered. The fourth and final section considers the implications of the 
results for tax policy in general and the current American situation in 
particular. 
10.1  Tax Policy in an Open Economy 
This section examines theoretically the effects of various tax policies 
in an open economy where capital is mobile. In considering taxation 
in an open economy it is crucial to distinguish between taxes on savings 
and those on investment. As I use the terms here, taxes on savings 
refer to taxes on capital income received by home-country residents 
regardless of where the capital is located. The U.S.  interest-income 
tax is an example of such a tax. Conversely, taxes on investment refer 
to taxes levied on capital within the home country, regardless of its 
ownership. The tax on corporate income is an example of an investment 
tax. In closed economies, it is clear that there is no important difference 
between savings and investment taxes. But in open economies, where 
capital flows are possible, they will have quite different effects. The 
model presented  below makes it possible  to analyze the short- and 
long-run effects of both pure savings and investment taxes. There are 
a variety of complexities involved in mapping real-world tax structures 
with their complex foreign tax credit and deferral provisions into the 
pure savings and investment taxes treated here. I bypass these problems. 
The main conclusions of the formal analysis presented below may 
be motivated by considering the national income accounting identity 
8-1 = X-M. This identity holds that the trade balance (X-M)  must equal 
the excess of domestic savings over investment. Equivalently, as the 
balance of payments must balance, the current account (X-M)  must be 
just offset by the capital account (S-Z). It is apparent from this identity 
that policies  which increase  national  investment  without  increasing 
national savings must necessarily lead to increases in imports or de- 
creases in  exports.  In  either event, the traded-goods  sector of  the 
economy will contract. Conversely, policies which increase national 
savings without affecting national investment will improve the current 
account and, in a fully employed economy, lead the traded-goods sector 
to expand. 
These results apply in the short and intermediate run. Ultimately, 
they will be reversed.  Consider again the case where investment is 
increased with no change in savings. Foreigners who finance the excess 
of  investment over savings will  accumulate claims on the domestic 
economy.  Ultimately  these claims must be  paid  back, and this will 
require that the home country run a trade surplus, exporting more than 353  Tax Policy and International Competitiveness 
it imports. Similarly, increases in domestic savings without changes in 
investment will lead ultimately to trade deficits as domestic residents 
liquidate their claims on foreign economies. 
10.1.1  Modelling the Linkages between Tax Policy and 
Competitiveness 
While a number of studies, notably Feldstein and Hartman (1980) 
and Hartman (1983), have examined the effects of tax policy on capital 
intensity, they have assumed that there is only one internationally pro- 
duced good making it impossible to study issues relating to competi- 
tiveness. Goulder, Shoven, and Whalley (1983) examine the implica- 
tions of international capital mobility within the context of a computable 
general equilibrium model and show that international considerations 
can have important implications for tax policy. Because the model they 
consider is not grounded in intertemporal optimization, it is not possible 
to distinguish the short- and long-run effects of  tax policies.  Lipton 
and Sachs (1983) examine a two-country growth model with two sectors 
producing traded and nontraded goods, and with investment function- 
based adjustment costs. Their model is sufficiently complex that it must 
be solved by numerical simulation. 
Here I follow very closely Bruno (1982) and less closely Sachs (1981, 
1982) in considering a two-period model in which the first period cor- 
responds to the short run and the second period corresponds to the 
long run. Consideration of a more realistic infinite horizon model would 
be analytically intractable. I treat the case of a small, open economy 
that takes both the price of the traded good and the interest rate as 
given. The analysis could be modified to treat the case of an economy 
large enough to affect world markets. 
Consider a two-commodity, two-period  framework. Tradeables  Qf 
are produced  in  each period  according to  the  production  function 
Qj = Q,(Lj,K’),  which is assumed to have constant returns to scale. 
The nontradeable domestic good  Qd is produced  with  the  constant 
returns-to-scale  production  function  Qd = QAL:,,KL). The  price  of 
tradeables is taken as the numeraire and price of the domestic good is 
denoted IT.  Increases in T  correspond to real appreciations of the local 
currency.  Production  of  tradeable  goods  is  allocated between  con- 
sumption C,,  investment I, and net exports X  which may be negative. 
Production  of  nontradeable  goods  is  divided  between  private  con- 
sumption Cd  and public consumption G. It is examined further below. 
The assumed  sectoral  specialization  of  investment  and government 
spending simplifies the analysis and does not alter the basic conclusions. 
Total labor supply in each period is fixed at zf,  (Lr = L:, + Lj). Total 
capital is fixed in the first period and cannot be reallocated between 
sectors. First-period investment or  disinvestment augments the second- 354  Lawrence H. Summers 
period capital stock. (Kzd - Kd  + Kj - Kf  = I).  Since for simplicity 
it is assumed that capital does not depreciate, it is reasonable to allow 
I to be  negative. No new  capital goods are produced in  the second 
period, since it represents posterity. 
Firms maximize the present value of after-corporate-tax profits: 
PV  = (1 -  T)[Q)  + T'QA - w'L' + R-'(Qj + T*Q$ - w2L2)]  - I' 
where R  = (1  + r). Note that since capital does not depreciate, the 
firm is allowed no tax depreciation allowances. Maximization subject 
to the production functions and factor accumulation constraints yields 
standard first-order conditions: 
(1)  .rr'dQA/aL$ = aQj/ay = W'  t  = 1,2 
(2)  R  = (1 -  ~)~'aQ~/dfi  = (1 -  ~)dQj/q 
where equality of first-period marginal products at the point Kd,  Kf  has 
been assumed.' 
At this point, we are ready to examine the implications of a corporate 
tax change for factor and product prices in the long run. Figure 10.1 
depicts the factor-price frontiers in the two sectors under the assump- 
tion that the traded-goods sector is more capital intensive. Production 
occurs at the intersection of the two frontiers. The relative price of the 
R0  R  -  R0 
1 -T 
Fig. 10.1  The long-run effects of corporate tax increase 355  Tax  Policy and International Competitiveness 
nontraded good, IT,  shifts until the factor-price frontiers intersect at 
the world interest rate. Now consider a corporate tax increase. The 
factor-price frontier for the tradeable good does not shift, but the re- 
quired pre-tax return on capital is increased from Ro to RO/l -  T. This 
necessitates a change in  IT  to shift the domestic-goods factor price 
frontier. It is clear from figure 10.1 that under our assumption that the 
traded-good sector is more capital intensive than the nontraded-goods 
sector, a corporate tax will lower capital intensity in both sectors and 
reduce the relative price of domestic goods, thereby causing the traded- 
goods sector to contract. The last result would be reversed if  the op- 
posite factor intensity assumption was maintained. 
Leamer (1980) presents some rather dated evidence on the relative 
capital intensities of U.S. traded and nontraded goods in the context 
of a study of the Leontief paradox. His data, drawn from Leontief's 
original work, indicate that the traded-goods sector is much more cap- 
ital intensive than the nontraded-goods sector. However, he notes that 
the more recent data provided in Baldwin (1971) suggests the opposite 
conclusion. At present, I am unaware of  more satisfactory evidence 
on  this question for the United  States. It  seems appropriate to be 
agnostic in the relative capital intensity question and to conclude that 
capital intensity effects will not lead to large effects of  tax policies on 
the long-run composition of  national output. 
As just demonstrated, it is possible to examine the impact of  a cor- 
porate tax change on factor and product prices in the long run without 
specifying anything about product demands. In order to address the 
sectoral composition of output and employment and to consider short- 
run issues, it is necessary to specify how demand is determined. For 
simplicity, I assume that consumers maximize a Cobb-Douglas utility 
function: 
(3) 
where D  is a discount factor, and  a is  the  share of  consumption- 
expenditure devoted to the foreign good. 
Households maximize utility subject to their budget constraint which 
holds that: 
u = alnCJ + (1 - a)lnCA + D[alnCj + (1 - a)lnCzd3 
(4)  CJ  + Tlc~  + [(I -  e)~i-l  (q  + IT~c',)  = R 
where R  represents the present value of their endowment in terms of 
the foreign good, and 8  is the tax rate levied on savings. Net household 
wealth R  is given by: 
(5)  R = (QJ + IT'QA) + [(l -  O)R]-'(Q~+IT~Q$)  - T -  Z 
where  T = 2"  + R-'T2 = nlG1 + R-'IT~GZ  is  the total  cumulative 
revenue of  the government. Since C$ + G'  = Qd,  it follows that: 356  Lawrence H. Summers 
(6)  R  = Q)(T')  + TIC$ + {[(l - 8)RI-'w2LZ 
- [(1 -  8)R]-',rr2GZ + Ed + K& 
where it can be assumed that Qf  is a negative function of  IT]. 
At this point we are ready to solve the model using the very ingenious 
graphical technique developed in Bruno (1982). Equation (6) and the 
assumption of Cobb-Douglas utility imply that: 
(7)  n'C$ = ~R[T',  R(l - 8) Gzl 
The bR function is negatively related to all three of its arguments. It 
is plotted as the line marked bR in figure 10.2. In order to characterize 
first-period equilibrium we add a supply function for the total value of 
cd: 
(8) 
This curve is also depicted in quadrant  1 of figure 10.2. 
Together these two schedules already permit us to characterize the 
determination of first-period equilibrium. Note that any policy which 
reduces first-period consumption, such as a reduction in the individual 
tax rate 8, will lead to a reduction in  TI  and an increase in the size of 
T'C$ = T'QXT') - T'G'. 
a:  -G' 
Fig. 10.2  The determination of  long-run equilibrium 357  Tax Policy and International Competitiveness 
the tradeable-goods sector. Likewise a decrease in public consumption 
will lead to a reduction in m,  and an increase in competitiveness. 
In what follows it will be useful to examine the behavior of domestic 
savings S. Note that S, = Yf - C). Given our assumption of Cobb- 
Douglas utility, C)  is proportional to mCh.  Drawing in  the schedule 
PYA,,)  where p = (1 -  a)/(a),  we can see that savings is proportional 
to the vertical distance between  this schedule and the bfl schedule. 
Note that the  pYf  schedule is steeper than the bfl schedule because 
b < p. 
We  are now ready to consider  second-period  equilibrium and the 
determination of investment. The determination of second-period fac- 
tor and product prices  has already been  discussed.  These serve to 
uniquely determine capital-labor and capital-output ratios in both sec- 
tors. In quadrant 2 of  figure 10.2, the relationship between mZC2d and 
Kz is depicted. The slope of this schedule increases with the period-2 
capital output ratio and  the intercept is aZGZ.  It  is  possible  to put 
mlCa and n2Pd  on the same axis because they are proportional by the 
Cobb-Douglas assumption. 
The requirement of full employment in period 2 is expressed as the 
z2  schedule in quadrant 3. It will be less (more) steep than the 45” line 
as the nontraded-goods sector is more (less) capital intensive than the 
traded-goods sector. The equation of  this  schedule is $K3  + y)K) 
= L2, where yi represents the labor-capital ratio in sector i, which is 
determined by factor prices. The level of investment can be read as 
the vertical distance between the zz  schedules and the 45” line’s 
intercept. 
The schedules in figure 10.2, along with the factor-price frontiers in 
figure 10.1, serve to fully characterize equilibrium. Notice, finally, that 
the current account, CA, is given by  S-I, which can be read from 
figure 10.2. 
10.1.2  Savings Incentives 
At this point, we are ready to consider the effects of policy changes. 
The effect of a decrease in period-1 public consumption is depicted in 
figure 10.3. As already noted, the relative price of nontradeables,  m, 
declines. Employment in the traded-goods sector increases, while de- 
creasing in the nontraded sector. National savings increases. None of 
the schedules in the other quadrants shifts. It is apparent that in the 
long run Kzd  increases and  decreases. Since capital-labor ratios are 
unchanged, it follows that employment in the traded-goods sector will 
decline in the long run after its initial increase. Investment will increase 
(decrease) as the traded-goods sector is less (more) capital intensive 
than the nontraded goods sector. As long as the nontraded-goods sector 
is not “far” more capital intensive than the traded-goods sector, savings 358  Lawrence H. Summers 
Fig. 10.3 
will increase more than investment, and a current-account surplus will 
result. 
The effects of a decrease in 8, which reduces private consumption, 
parallel those of a reduction in public consumption. They cannot be 
neatly  analyzed  diagrammatically because a change in  8 breaks  the 
proportionality between dCA and ,rr2Cd.  Note however that the effect 
of  a savings incentive will be to raise rr2Cd,  and give rise to second- 
period effects very similar to those of a change in government spending. 
The traded-goods sector will  expand in the short run and contract in 
the long run. Investment may rise or fall but it is unlikely to change a 
great deal. 
The effect of a saving incentive 
10.1.3  Investment Incentives 
The effects of  an investment incentive, treated here as a decline in 
T,  are depicted in figure  10.4. The solution is most easily achieved 
working backwards. It is clear that, with capital mobile, the long-run 359  Tax Policy and International Competitiveness 
Fig. 10.4  The effect of an investment incentive 
effect of an investment incentive will  be to raise capital intensity in 
both production sectors and to raise real wages. Thus the z2  schedule 
in the third quadrant shifts downwards. The shift will be parallel in the 
special case depicted here where the elasticities of substitution in the 
two sectors are equal. The capital output ratio in the domestic goods 
sector must increase, shifting the m2C2 schedule down and to the left. 
Finally, the increase in second-period real wages increases human wealth 
and shifts the bR  schedule in the first quadrant upwards. 
The effect of an investment incentive is to reduce short-run com- 
petitiveness and to reduce domestic savings. Long-run capital intensity 
is increased, so the current account declines unambiguously. An  in- 
vestment incentive has an ambiguous effect on m2, the relative price 
of nontradeables, depending on the relative capital intensities of the 
two sectors. In the special case of  the two sectors with equal capital 
intensity, an investment subsidy will increase long-run employment in 
the  traded-goods  sector.  More  generally,  however,  the  result  is 
ambiguous. 
In assessing the implications of this theoretical analysis, a crucial 
question arises. How much real time corresponds to the short and long 
run  in  the stylized two-period  model considered here? The issue is 360  Lawrence H. Summers 
difficult to judge, but  it seems likely that the model’s short-run pre- 
dictions are applicable over fairly long horizons. Policies directed at 
increasing the domestic capital stock are likely to lead to increased net 
investment for many years as new capital is accumulated. The available 
evidence, while weak, suggests that capital adjusts relatively slowly to 
its desired level. Likewise simulations of the type presented by Sum- 
mers (1979) and Chamley (1981) suggest that households will take pe- 
riods of up to a decade to fully adjust their wealth holding following a 
change in  the available rate of return. These considerations  suggest 
that, with a horizon of a decade or less, it is probably appropriate to 
use the short-run predictions of the economy to tax reforms. The sim- 
ulation  results  of  Lipton and  Sachs (1983) are consistent  with  this 
suggestion. 
10.1.4  The Political Economy of  International Competitiveness 
The arguments  in this  section raise  an obvious question.  Why  is 
business-tax relief so frequently advocated as a vehicle for increasing 
international competitiveness? The analysis here suggests that tax re- 
duction measures, which encourage investment, inevitably reduce com- 
petitiveness and hurt firms in the traded-goods sector as long as capital 
is mobile internationally.  In part, advocacy of  tax relief must result 
from a failure to consider its general equilibrium ramifications. With 
fixed real exchange rates, tax relief does help the traded-goods sector. 
Its advocates may fail to take account of the increase in real exchange 
rates  that  necessarily  accompanies  capital  inflows. But  economists 
should be reluctant to assume that self-interested parties are advocating 
positions contrary to their interests. It is therefore worthwhile to con- 
sider other reasons why  those in  the traded-goods sector might ad- 
vocate tax relief. 
A first possibility is that they are motivated by  long-run considera- 
tions. Accumulating debt to foreigners will eventually require that we 
run a trade surplus. But it seems unlikely that such a long-run consid- 
eration plays an important role in  current policy debates. A second 
explanation starts with the recognition that the traded-goods sector is 
not monolithic. Tax reforms which benefit firms in some, but not all, 
of the traded-goods sector may cause their competitiveness to increase 
even as the total traded-goods sector is shrinking. It might, for example, 
be argued that incentives to invest in plant and equipment benefit Amer- 
ican manufacturers at the expense of farmers. The corporate sector is 
so large a fraction of the traded-goods  sector that it  seems unlikely 
that this is the whole story. 
A  third explanation for the advocacy of  investment incentives to 
increase competitiveness is that advocates suspect that investment in- 
centives will not, in fact, lead to prolonged capital inflows. This may 361  Tax Policy and International Competitiveness 
be because capital mobility  is limited, and so investment incentives 
will lead to only small capital inflows. Alternatively, it may be because 
governments are perceived as unlikely to permit large trade deficits to 
continue for long periods of time. In either of these cases, tax incentives 
will raise the after-tax profits of firms in the traded-goods  sector and 
will not lead to significant declines in competitiveness. I  explore the 
question of the extent of international capital mobility in the remainder 
of the paper. 
10.2  National Savings and National Investment 
The preceding section demonstrated that the assumption of perfect 
international capital mobility has important implications for the anal- 
ysis of competitiveness. It also is important for other fiscal questions. 
With  internationally  mobile  capital, taxes on investment will  all  be 
borne by  labor. Government budget deficits  will  not  affect national 
levels of investment, but  will  instead  reduce investment around the 
world. More generally,  policies  which  increase national savings will 
have no effect on national investment. 
In provocative recent papers, Feldstein and Horioka (1980) and Feld- 
stein (1983) point out that if  national  savings do not  affect national 
investment as the capital mobility hypothesis implies, one would not 
expect to see any strong relationship  between national  savings and 
investment rates. Yet, as table 10.1 demonstrates, there is a very close 
association between levels of national savings and national investment. 
While the long-run  average net savings rate varied across countries 
between 6.5 and 19.6%, the largest average current account deficit was 
8.3%, and the largest surplus was only 2.3%. The correlation between 
domestic savings and investment rates was .92. 
Table  10.2 presents regressions of the national investment rates on 
national savings rates for a number of different intervals.  Using both 
net and gross measures, the data suggest a strong relationship between 
investment and savings.2 In all cases, the savings variable is  highly 
significant. It is noteworthy that there is no evidence that the impact 
of national savings on national investment has declined through time, 
even though institutional barriers to international capital mobility have 
been broken down over the past 25 years. There is some evidence, 
however,  that the correlation between savings and investment rates 
has declined through time. 
Comparisons of the size of actual capital flows with those that might 
be expected highlight the apparent immobility of capital. Consider a 
policy which raises the return on domestic investment by 20%. This is 
about the right order of  magnitude for the  1981 and  1982 U.S.  tax 
reforms. Assuming a Cobb-Douglas production function with a capital 362  Lawrence H. Summers 
Table 10.1  Net Savings and Investment, 1960-1983 
Country 
Net Savings  Net Investment  I-s 
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Source: OECD. 
share of  .25, an increase of  about 20% in the capital stock would be 
required to equalize the return on domestic and international  invest- 
ment.  With a capital output ratio of  1.5, this would mean a capital 
inflow of  close to 30% of  GNP. Only  one OECD nation,  Portugal, 
experienced a capital inflow of this magnitude over the 1975-81  period. 
Stating the point differently-the  capital flows that are observed do not 
seem to be large enough to have very large effects on rates of  return. 
A number of  papers including Sachs (1981, 1982), Feldstein (19831, 
and Caprio and Howard (1984) have examined the relationships  be- 
tween  changes in domestic savings and investment rates. While the 
approaches taken in these papers differ somewhat, several conclusions 
emerge. There is a positive relationship between changes in domestic 
savings and changes in domestic investment that is weaker than the 
relationship between savings and investment levels. Also, it appears 
that shocks both to domestic savings and to domestic investment have 
significant effects on the current account, although their relative im- 
portance is a subject of  debate. Finally, there is very weak evidence 
that the degree of international capital mobility has increased somewhat 363  Tax Policy and International Competitiveness 
able  10.2  The Correlation Between National Investment and National 
Savings 
Period  Intercept  Si  RZ 
Net 
1 960-  1 964  .015  .962  .821 
1965- 1969  .043  .750  .687 
1970-1974  .042  .777  .733 
1975-1979  .025  .941  ,528 
1980-1983  .024  .%O  .586 
(.013)  (.095) 
(.016)  (.1W 
(.017)  (.ow 
(.024)  (. 185) 
(.OM)  (. 164) 
1%0-1964 
1965 -  1969 
1970- 1974 



























in recent years. But, none of the time-series analysis calls into question 
the proposition that domestic savings and investment rates are closely 
linked. 
One consideration that could account for some degree of association 
between domestic savings and investment rates is the fact that countries 
are not perfectly “small” on the world capital market. A share of each 
country’s savings would be invested in it, even if capital were perfectly 
mobile. It seems unlikely that this can account for a large part of the 
correlation between savings and investment rates. Even for the United 
States, a dollar of savings would be expected to produce only about 
25 or 30 cents of domestic investment, if  capital were really perfectly 
mobile. Moreover, this point has no force in  considering the cross- 
sectional association between domestic savings and investment rates. 
Another possible  source of  association between domestic savings 
and investment is  Keynesian effects. Increases in investment which 
raise domestic income temporarily would be expected to increase do- 
mestic savings as well. The fact that savings and investment rates are 364  Lamence H. Summers 
about equally highly  correlated over short and long periods  of time 
suggests that this is not likely to be too important a factor. 
It is  not  clear how  to interpret the observation that  savings  and 
investment rates are highly correlated across countries. The questions 
of policy interest concern the allocation of the marginal dollar of do- 
mestic savings, or the financing of a marginal  dollar of domestic in- 
vestment. It is conceivable that incremental savings are invested in  a 
very different way than the average dollar of savings. The fact that the 
linkages between changes in  savings and changes in  investment are 
weaker than those between levels suggests this view. An argument of 
this kind  must explain, however,  why ongoing capital flows  are not 
observed between countries with stable high and low savings rates. In 
the next section  we consider alternative explanations for the close 
association  between savings and investment rates across nations. These 
explanations have differing implications for the hypothesis of marginal 
capital mobility and for the effects of fiscal policies. 
10.3  Explaining Apparent Capital Mobility 
The previous section documented the very high correlation between 
national  savings  and investment rates. This section  considers three 
possible explanations  for this phenomenon. These explanations assume 
in turn that capital mobility is greatly limited by institutional factors, 
that the correlation between national savings and investment rates is 
a spurious reflection of third factors, and that apparent capital immo- 
bility  reflects  the endogenous adjustment of savings and  investment 
rates. While there is some element of truth in each of these explana- 
tions, we are led to accept the third one as the primary reason for the 
close association of domestic savings and investment rates. 
10.3.1  Capital Immobility 
A first natural explanation for the observed savings and investment 
patterns is that most capital is immobile. While some capital can flow 
freely,  restrictions  in  financial  institutions, capital controls, and the 
perceivedrisks of foreign investment greatly reduce the flow of capital. 
As Feldstein and Horioka (1980) suggest, “official restrictions impede 
the export of capital. Moreover the fear of future capital export controls 
by potential host countries , . . deters investors. . . . Important insti- 
tutional rigidities also tend to keep a large segment of domestic savings 
at home. The most obvious of these in the United States is the savings 
institutions that are required  by  law to be invested in  mortgages  on 
local real estate.” 
There is, of course, a large pool of very liquid international capital. 
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other savings being immobile. This raises an immediate problem. If 
only a small pool of  “hot  money”  were available to arbitrage large 
international  return differentials,  one would expect that it would all 
end up in one place. As long as some mobile funds are located almost 
everywhere there is a presumption that rates of return must be equalized. 
The related argument of Feldstein and Horioka, that returns on short- 
term financial assets are arbitraged  while returns on longer-term in- 
vestments are not equalized, is also difficult to accept. Arbitrage, like 
equality, is transitive. As long as there are institutions in each country 
(e.g., Citibank) which hold different types of domestic assets, and also 
hold some foreign asset, we can be sure that the returns on domestic 
and foreign  assets are arbitraged.  Equalization  of  returns  does not 
require that there be any agent who makes long-term investments both 
at home and abroad. As long as the standard assumption of marginal 
domestic capital mobility is maintained, the existence of investors at 
interior solutions holding any domestic and any foreign assets is suf- 
ficient to insure marginal capital mobility on an international bask3 
A clear piece of evidence suggesting the mobility of capital inter- 
nationally is the fact that the relatively small net flows of capital that 
are observed  reflect large offsetting gross flows. If  capital were im- 
mobile,  one would  expect  to see small gross as well  as net  flows. 
Unfortunately data on foreign investment by domestic firms and do- 
mestic investment by foreign firms are not available on a consistent 
international basis. Therefore, table 10.3 presents some information on 
gross and net flows of investment for the United States. In 1982, both 
capital inflows and outflows for the U.S. were more than ten times the 
Table 10.3  Net and Gross Flows in the U.S. 
1982  1981 
(Billions of $) 
Current-account balancea 
Net foreign investment 
Increase in  U.S. assets abroadb 
(capital outflows) 










Source: Survey of Current Business, March 1983, pp. 13 and 51. 
Note: The reason that the difference of the gross flows is not equal to the reported net 
flows is a sizable statistical discrepancy. 
aThe current-account balance and net foreign investment are conceptually the same, 
differing only by the allocations of SDRs (“capital grants” in the NIPA) and some small 
definitional differences. 
bThe net increase over the year; that is, conceptually, the difference between the value 
of assets at the end of the year and the value at the year’s beginning. 366  Lawrence H. Summers 
net flow of capital. Even these figures underestimate the true flows, 
because they fail to take account of replacement investment by Amer- 
icans abroad and foreigners here. 
Large reciprocal gross investment flows also call into question Feld- 
stein’s (1983)  argument that subjective uncertainties inhibit capital flows. 
Feldstein and Horioka argue that foreign investment is typically di- 
rected at exploiting specialized opportunities rather than the general 
pursuit of higher returns. This claim is difficult to reconcile with the 
large volume of portfolio investment and with Hartman’s (1983)  dem- 
onstration that foreign direct investment is very sensitive to tax con- 
siderations. Recall that no foreign direct investment is necessary for 
international  arbitrage to equalize returns. Even granting that direct 
foreign investments represent special situations, it is still reasonable 
to expect that increased domestic savings that reduce domestic rates 
of return would lead to more specialized foreign investments. 
This discussion  suggests that there exist capital flows which seem 
to have the potential to equalize rates of  return around the world. A 
more subtle explanation for capital immobility, which accommodates 
this observation, might suggest that total net capital mobility is limited 
by fears of expropriation. This is the essential idea lying behind the 
burgeoning literature on international debt. It was first treated formally 
by  Eaton and Gersovitz (1981). While capital can be freely moved, 
investors are aware that, if a country has imported too much capital, 
the gains from expropriating it will exceed the costs that can be im- 
posed. In this case, marginal investors will not invest abroad even if 
foreign assets are yielding higher returns. At the margin, capital will 
be immobile. Changes in domestic saving will affect international cap- 
ital flows only insofar as they affect countries’ debt capacity by  af- 
fecting the size of the “punishment”  that can be inflicted on them for 
defaulting. 
It  would  seem likely that arguments of  this type would be more 
applicable to less-developed countries (LDCs) than to the OECD na- 
tions where expropriations seem implausible. One way of  testing this 
explanation for apparent capital immobility is to examine the associ- 
ation between savings and investment across a broad range of countries. 
If  expropriation fears were a major cause of capital immobility, one 
would expect to see savings and investment rates even more closely 
associated among LDCs than among the OECD nations. This hypoth- 
esis was tested by examining data on national savings and investment 
rates for 115 countries using data provided by the World Bank. 
A regression of investment rates on savings rates using data arranged 
over the 1973-80 period yields: 
ZIY  = 18 +  .311(S/Y)  R2 = .24 
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These results were almost unchanged when the OECD countries were 
excluded from the sample. As a further check, the equation was rees- 
timated dropping observations with large residuals from the sample. 
Observations with residuals with absolute value greater than two and 
three times the standard error of the regression were omitted. This did 
not have a significant impact on the results. One possible explanation 
for the low correlation between savings and investment is that aid flows 
drive a wedge between investment and savings even though capital is 
immobile. However, subtracting aid flows from investment had little 
impact on the results. It might be argued that the low correlation be- 
tween domestic savings and investment is the result of measurement 
error. This seems unlikely. In most cases, domestic savings is estimated 
as a residual. When this method is used, measurement error may result 
in  a  spurious  positive  correlation  between  measured  savings  and 
investment. 
The results suggest a much greater degree of apparent capital mobility 
when  a large sample of  countries is considered.  Similar results are 
reported by Fieleke (1982) and Frankel (1985). This provides evidence 
against the hypothesis of capital immobility, which offers exactly the 
wrong predictions-that  capital should be most mobile against politi- 
cally allied developed countries with well-functioning capital markets. 
It does not seem reasonable to conclude that capital immobility is 
the right way to explain the close association between national savings 
and investment rates. I therefore turn to other explanations. 
10.3.2  Common Factor Explanations 
Another possible explanation for the close association between na- 
tional savings and investment rates is the fallacy of the common cause. 
Perhaps there is some third factor which determines both savings and 
investment, leading them to be highly correlated, even though exog- 
enous changes in  savings would have only very small effects on in- 
vestment. Two such factors suggest themselves. Countries with high 
rates of population- or productivity-growth would be expected to have 
high investment rates because of the opportunities created by a rapidly 
growing labor pool. Lifecycle savings considerations suggest that such 
countries should also have high savings rates, as young savers are more 
numerous and have more lifetime income than older dissavers. Thus, 
growth could be a common factor accounting for associations between 
savings and investment.  Obstfeld (1985) provides a rather elaborate 
example illustrating this point. 
A second factor that could lead to a positive association of savings 
and investment is initial wealth. A clear example is provided by a nation 
ravaged by  war.  Such a country would be  expected to have a high 
investment rate because of  the destruction of its capital stock, and a 368  Lawrence W. Summers 
high savings rate because of households’ desire to rebuild their wealth 
holdings. Any source of  initial differences in national wealth income 
ratios would tend to work the same way. 
The growth explanation for the strong association between savings 
and investment rates is easily tested. It is only necessary to add mea- 
sures of the rate of  growth to a regression of  the investment rate on 
the savings rate. 
A regression of the net investment rate on the net savings rate and 
the rates of population growth and productivity growth using the data 
in table 10.1 yields: 
ZIY  =  -.015  + 1.02 S/Y - .002n + .0026g  R2 = .703 
(.023)  (1.39)  (.01)  (.001) 
Similar results are obtained reversing the equation, using gross rather 
than net concepts and varying the sample period. Adding growth vari- 
ables actually increases the coefficient on SIY. This implies that vari- 
ations in savings that are uncorrelated with variations in growth actually 
have more relation to investment than variations explained by the growth 
variables. Growth is not the spurious factor accounting for the strong 
correlations between national savings and investment rates. 
There is no single variable which can capture the possible effects of 
initial conditions on both savings and investment. Therefore it is nec- 
essary to take a more indirect approach. Estimating the basic investment- 
savings relationship with instrumental variables, using as instruments 
any variable expected to affect savings but not investment, will yield 
a consistent estimate of the “pure”  correlation between savings and 
investment. Feldstein and Horioka report a number of estimates of this 
type using social security variables as instruments. They find that this 
has little effect on the estimated savings coefficient. Indeed, in several 
cases it actually increases. Frankel (1985) presents some corroborating 
evidence. 
In order to further examine this issue, the basic savings investment 
relationship was reestimated using the government budget deficit as an 
instrument. Because of data limitations, a smaller sample (14 countries) 
and a shorter time period (1973-80) were used in the estimation. For 
this sample the net result of an OLS regression was: 
ZIY  = .02 + .97 (SIY) 
(.03)  (.13) 
Using the government deficit as a share of GDP as an instrument, the 
result was: 
ZIY  = -  .I0 + 1.45 (S/Y) 
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This result is surprising. The coefficient on the savings variable rises 
substantially rather than declining. It attains an implausible value ex- 
ceeding one. On the “spurious factor”  explanation, one would have 
expected the savings coefficient to decline. 
There is no evidence here to support the “spurious factor” expla- 
nation for the close association of national savings and investment rates. 
But  the  last equation does raise  a puzzle. Why  should purging the 
savings and investment variables of the effects of their common causes 
cause their estimated association to increase? Clearly the answer must 
have something to do with the properties of the deficit variable. This 
issue is explored in the next subsection. 
10.3.3  The Maintained External Balance Hypothesis 
The assumption has been made so far that national savings and in- 
vestment  rates are exogenously  determined.  Feldstein  and Horioka 
treat differences in national savings rates as a consequence of “basic 
structural differences among countries.”  In their formal model (1980, 
p. 324), the level of public savings is an exogenous variable affecting 
the national savings rate. 
An  alternative view is that  countries consistently  manipulate  the 
levels of economic policy with a view to maintaining external balance. 
Such an argument has been made by Fieleke (1982) and Tobin (1983) 
among others.  In  this  case, capital  appears immobile only  because 
countries pursue policies that bring savings and investment into bal- 
ance. Possible rationales for this behavior are discussed below. 
The endogeneity of budget policy can easily explain the empirical 
results in the preceding section. Consider the special case where capital 
is completely mobile on world markets, and countries set budget deficits 
according to: 
(9) 
where Di is the deficit, Psi  is private saving, and ui represents the effect 
of other factors on the deficit of country i.  The assumption that deficits 
are exogenous corresponds to a = 0 in this formulation. Standard cal- 
culations suggest that the coefficient on saving in our basic equation 
will equal: 
(10)  SOLS  = 
Di = a(PSi -  Zi)  + ui,  with 0 5 a 5 1 
(1 -  4UPS.I + ad 
(1 -  a)’af.s  + aza:  + 241 - a)(Tps., + a: 
Notice that in the special case where a = 1 and af = 0, 6 =  I, and 
that with Feldstein and Horioka’s implicit assumptions that a = 0 and 
ups., = 0 in a perfect capital market, 6 = 0. As these polar cases sug- 
gest, increases in a  and reductions in af will tend to raise the value of 
6. Direct estimation of (9) yields: 370  Lawrence H. Summers 
D; =  -.01  + .715 (PSj -  Zj) 
(.004)  (.107)  a:  = .00024 
R$ = .77 
(1 1) 
Using this estimated value of  a and the observed  sample moments 
tautologically yields the OLS estimate for 6.  If  we reevaluate (10) as- 
suming that a = 0 and that a:  = a$, the implied value of 6 is  397. 
This confirms that some of the strength of the Feldstein and Horioka 
results arises from deficit policy actions directed at maintaining external 
balance. Note that Feldstein (1983) admits that some positive associ- 
ation between PS; and Zi is to be expected, arising from factors such 
as growth rates that simultaneously affect both Psi  and Z;. And other 
policy levers besides deficits may be used to bring savings and invest- 
ment into balance. Hence, the remaining correlation of  .6 should not 
be treated as evidence of the immobility of capital. 
The maintained external balance hypothesis also explains the para- 
doxical results obtained when Di is used as an instrument. In this case, 
the probability limit of the coefficient of interest is given by: 
which will be greater than unity as long as: 
a(1 - a)  var (I-PS), > at, 
The estimates of 6,"  and ut, reported above imply that this condition 
is satisfied in practice. 
This section has  shown that  the maintained  external balance  hy- 
pothesis can explain  how  the observed  high  correlation of  national 
savings and investment rates could occur in a world with perfect capital 
mobility. It also explains an additional finding (the high degree of capital 
mobility among less-developed countries) that is anomalous given the 
view that capital is internationally immobile. In these nations, the pres- 
sure to maintain external balance is much weaker, and so fiscal policy 
actions are not taken to prevent capital flows. As a consequence, greater 
current-account imbalances and capital mobility are observed. 
The maintained external balance hypothesis seems on the basis of 
the evidence considered here to be the most plausible explanation for 
the high cross-sectional correlation between domestic savings and in- 
vestment rates. By its nature it is difficult to test, since levels of national 
savings and investment are affected by a wide variety of policy levers, 
and so the stance of policy towards saving and investment in any given 
country is difficult to evaluate. Below, I discuss a number of plausible 
reasons why nations might seek to maintain external balance. The fact 
that countries so frequently resort to capital controls that force savings 371  Tax Policy and International Competitiveness 
and investment into balance makes it very plausible that they also use 
other policy levers to achieve the same purpose. 
Capital will be effectively immobile internationally if  nations act so 
as to avoid either capital outflows or capital inflows. Either would be 
sufficient to preclude capital flows. Consider first the incentives nations 
might  have to avoid  capital outflows. The fundamental reason why 
nations might prefer to do this is that the social return to domestic 
investment exceeds that of foreign investment, even when their private 
returns are equated. Most obviously, this will be the case where there 
are taxes on domestic investment. More subtly and more importantly, 
there is the risk associated with capital expropriation by government 
action or by  labor.4 Keynes (1924) puts the argument well: “Consider 
two investments, the one at home and the other abroad, with equal 
risks of  repudiation or confiscation or legislation restricting profit. It 
is a matter of  indifference to the individual investor which he selects. 
But the nation as a whole retains in the one case the object of  the 
investment and fruits of  it; whilst in the other case both are lost. If a 
loan to improve South American capital is repudiated we have nothing. 
If  a Poplar housing loan is repudiated, we  as a nation still have the 
houses.” 
Note that the phrase “legislation restricting profit” covers a host of 
possibilities far short of outright nationalization. There is also the pos- 
sibility that capital expropriation will take the form of actions by work- 
ers to raise wages and capture the rents that can be earned from ir- 
reversible capital investments. Together these possibilities seem likely 
to be of substantial importance. They provide a motivation for countries 
which find themselves exporting capital on a substantial scale to pursue 
measures directed at spurring domestic investment. Insofar as they 
suggest that the social return to foreign investment may be rather low, 
they also suggest the possible desirability of  reducing savings when 
they are primarily flowing abroad. Certainly this was Keynes’s view 
regarding the huge  British capital outflows in  the early part of  this 
century. 
It is noteworthy in this regard that capital-exporting nations tend to 
be large countries with substantial international power. The British in 
the Victorian era and the United States during the post-World  War  I1 
period are obvious examples. The current Japanese situation is less 
clear. Where capital outflows are made by dominant international pow- 
ers they may confer external benefits which raise their social return 
by increasing international influence. Large countries may also regard 
themselves as relatively immune from expropriation risks. The striking 
feature of table 10.2 is that almost all of the small countries are capital 
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quantities, however, the scope for international capital mobility is rel- 
atively limited. 
Keynes went on to provide an additional reason why a nation might 
want to limit its capital  export^.^ He wrote that “Foreign  investment 
does not automatically expand our exports by a corresponding amount. 
It so affects the foreign exchanges that we are compelled to export 
more in order to maintain our solvency. It may be the case-I  fancy 
that it now is the case-that  we can only do this by lowering the price 
of  our products in terms of  the products of other nations, that is by 
allowing the ratio of real interchange to move to our disadvantage.” 
This consideration, which is important only for countries with some 
market power,  may  also help to explain why  large capital  outflows 
are  so rare.  A  possible  example is  provided  by  the  efforts of  the 
United States to limit capital outflows in the early  1960s in an effort 
to maintain the value of the dollar. Whether the motivation for main- 
taining the value of  the dollar was enjoying favorable terms of trade 
is not clear. 
There are also reasons why countries would be reluctant to accept 
large capital inflows. Where these are associated with large movements 
in real exchange rates, they are likely to damage severely an economy’s 
traded-goods sector. This may generate political pressures to increase 
domestic savings or to reduce the rate of investment. These pressures 
are likely to be particularly  serious in situations where the real ex- 
change rate changes quickly or where the traded-goods sector is not 
benefiting from the capital  inflows. It  should not  be  surprising that 
capital inflows into Canada to finance development of  its natural  re- 
sources have proved more politically acceptable than  recent inflows 
into the United States to finance budget deficits. 
These arguments are suggestive as to why we see such a small volume 
of  net international  capital mobility. Evaluating their relative impor- 
tance is left for future research.  In the next section, we tentatively 
accept their validity and explore their implications for economic policy. 
10.4  Conclusions 
Our analysis of  the historical  experience of the last twenty years 
suggests that capital was internationally mobile but that governments 
acted so as to permit only relatively small capital flows. This makes it 
difficult to analyze the effects of tax policy changes. Such changes, if 
not accommodated by other policies, would lead to significant capital 
flows with associated implications for competitiveness. But the historic 
record suggests that policy changes are adopted to maintain external 
balance.  If  such changes are always adopted, capital  is  effectively 
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national savings. The effect of any policy depends on the policies it 
engenders. Consider, for example, an investment tax credit. The re- 
sulting capital inflow would lead to a trade deficit. If this created pres- 
sures leading to an increase in public savings, the ultimate result would 
be more domestic investment, with only a small effect on the traded- 
goods sector. If, on the other hand, other countries responded to their 
capital outflows by strengthening capital controls, the result would be 
increased domestic interest rates and only relatively small investment 
increases.  In  this  case short-run competitiveness  might  actually  be 
improved by investment tax incentives. 
Clearly there are no general principles which can be used to assess 
the effects of different policies in all situations. Neither the analytic 
benchmark of perfect capital mobility nor the polar opposite assump- 
tion that capital is immobile seems appropriate in assessing the effects 
of tax reforms. 
These points are well illustrated by considering the current American 
situation. The dollar is extremely strong, having risen by about 60% in 
the last four years. This has led to the large trade and current-account 
deficits, which are regarded by many observers as a cause for grave 
concern. Beyond the direct effects on industries producing traded goods, 
concerns are expressed about the  United  States becoming a debtor 
nation, and about a weakening in our national commitment to free trade. 
Following the Reagan tax incentives, an increase of  close to 25% in 
the capital stock would be necessary to bring the after-tax return to 
capital back to its former level. Since the United States is not a small 
country on the world capital market, not all of these funds would come 
from abroad even if  capital were  perfectly  mobile. But with mobile 
capital, one would have to predict a cumulative current-account deficit 
in excess of  15% of GNP in response to the 1981 tax cuts. This is on 
top of any current-account deficit attributable to federal budget deficits. 
It  seems unlikely that  such  large,  sustained capital inflows will  be 
allowed to materialize. Some combination of increased savings through 
reduced budget deficits and expansionary monetary policy is likely to 
be used to restore external balance. Thus, the recent U.S. experience 
is in a sense the exception that proves the validity of the maintained 
external balance hypothesis. 
Note, finally, that the maintained  external balance hypothesis re- 
solves the riddle of why firms producing traded goods favor investment 
incentives. If  they expect these incentives to be coupled with other 
policies directed at stabilizing the current account, they are rational in 
advocating investment incentives. This is true if investment incentives 
are accommodated by increased public savings, expansionary monetary 
policies, or even protectionist policies. This point may well be illus- 
trated by the evolution of the U.S. economy over the next few years. 374  Lawrence H. Summers 
Notes 
1.  Note  that the formulation  here  requires  that capital  invested  in either 
sector earn the world  rate of  return  R  in period  2.  As  Frankel  (1985)  has 
stressed, there is no reason to expect that real interest rates measured relative 
to a domestic price index that includes both tradeable and nontradeable goods 
will be equalized across countries. Indeed, as long as purchasing power parity 
fails as a description of  exchange rate behavior,  real interest rates cannot be 
equalized, measured both relative to price changes in tradeable goods and the 
domestic consumption basket.  In the model considered  here, despite capital 
mobility, there is no real interest rate equalization measured  in the standard 
way using general domestic price indices. 
2. There is no  obvious reason for regressing investment  on savings rather 
than running  the reverse regression.  The interested  reader can compute the 
coefficient that would be obtained from the reverse regression by dividing the 
reported coefficient into the regression’s R2.  The reverse regression coefficients 
tend to be a little smaller than the reported coefficients. 
3. Zeira (1986), in a very perceptive  analysis, notes that this conclusion is 
only correct if  assets are perfect substitutes in individual portfolios. The em- 
pirical importance of this qualification is, however, open to question, given the 
findings of Frankel (1985) that the standard CAPM along with reasonable as- 
sumptions  regarding  risk  aversion  implies that  assets are in fact very  close 
substitutes. 
4. I am indebted to Jeff Sachs for bringing Keynes’s discussion of this issue 
to my attention. 
5.  This argument in many ways paraltels the one developed by Roger Gordon 
in his discussion of this paper. 
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Comment  Jeffrey A. Frankel 
This paper is a much-needed attempt to interpret the businessman’s 
view that taxation which raises the cost of  capital is “bad for inter- 
national competitiveness,”  and specifically that cutting corporate in- 
come taxes would help the national trade balance. This view needs 
interpreting, because we would expect, from the identity that the current- 
account balance is equal to national  savings minus investment, that 
any incentives that succeed in stimulating investment would in general 
worsen the trade balance. At least we would expect this in the short 
run.  In the longer run, intertemporal considerations suggest that the 
current-account balance will be zero.  Summers proposes the size of 
the tradable-goods  sector as the definition of  “competitiveness,”  in 
place of  the size of  the trade balance, thus leaving the question open. 
The paper is divided into two, very different, parts. The first part is 
theoretical. Its conclusion is that, if tradable goods are capital intensive, 
then subsidies to investment will increase the size of the tradable sector, 
Jeffrey A. Frankel is a professor of economics at the University of California, Berkeley, 
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under  the condition  of  imperfect  international capital mobility. The 
latter qualifying condition is a controversial one. The second half of 
the paper attempts to measure the degree of capital mobility, along the 
lines of  the Feldstein-Horioka  tests of  saving-investment correlation. 
Presumably the aim is to see whether investment incentives do increase 
the size of  the tradable-goods  sector; but the capital mobility testing 
is  an entirely  self-contained  discussion.  I  will  allocate most  of  my 
comments to that part of the paper. 
There have been many econometric critiques of the Feldstein-Horioka 
literature,  and  Summers mentions  most  of  them.  The  critiques are 
correct on the econometrics (though Feldstein and Horioka themselves 
made a better attempt to address problems of econometric endogeneity, 
through the use of instrumental variables, than many of the critics who 
followed in  their footsteps). But in  my  view the critiques are beside 
the point, if  the point is to estimate the degree of capital mobility in 
the sense of the degree of international integration of financial markets. 
Let us begin by reviewing the statistical facts. They have been found 
puzzling to many who interpret them in terms of the degree of capital 
mobility, and in any case are considered striking by all parties. 
First, the  correlation of  national  investment  with  national  saving 
(defined as private  savings minus the government budget deficit) is 
greater than zero, and in fact is relatively close to unity. If one accepts 
a causal interpretation, the finding says that changes in national saving 
are offset by net capital inflows only to a relatively minor degree, and 
are reflected primarily as changes in national investment; fiscal crowd- 
ing out of  investment,  for example, does  take  place.  This was the 
original result of  Feldstein and Horioka, interpreted by them as evi- 
dencing a low degree of international capital mobility. 
Summers adds a second statistical fact by including less-developed 
countries (LDCs) in the sample: the saving-investment correlation is 
no lower for industrial countries than for LDCs. This finding, noted 
earlier by Fieleke (1982, pp.  154-55),  seems puzzling. In light of  the 
default risk, the greater government use of capital controls, and the 
less advanced state of financial markets in LDCs, one would expect 
to find lower capital mobility for this group. 
A third statistical fact is analogous to the preceding one, but in the 
time dimension rather than the cross-section dimension:  the saving- 
investment correlation is no lower after 1974 than it was before  1974. 
Again, in light of the greater use of capital controls and the less ad- 
vanced  state of financial markets before  1974 than after, one would 
expect  a higher degree of  capital mobility  in the later period.  The 
Summers paper-both  the results reported in table  10.2 and the dis- 
cussion of  them-is  ambiguous  on the question of  how the saving- 377  Tax Policy and International Competitiveness 
investment correlation has changed over time. But Feldstein (1983) and 
Penati and Dooley (1984) found no sign of a decline in the correlation.’ 
Most economists seem inclined to conclude from the statistical find- 
ing that the saving-investment correlation is stubbornly high, that there 
must be something wrong methodologically with this way of estimating 
the degree of capital mobility. Hence the many econometric critiques. 
Most can be subsumed in the general complaint that the righthand-side 
variable is correlated with the error term, that is, that national saving 
is endogenous. Though this econometric problem is an ever-present 
danger in macroeconomics, it is particularly likely to arise when the 
lefthand-side and righthand-side variables are linked by an identity (via 
the current account, in this case). There are four common varieties of 
the critique: the procyclicality of both saving and investment rates, the 
large-country problem, the government policy reaction problem (which 
Summers calls the “maintained external balance hypothesis”), and the 
influence of population growth, or other third factors, on both saving 
and investment rates. All are potentially serious problems, but in my 
view all can be handled with some degree of success. A cross-section 
study largely avoids the procyclicality and large-country problems from 
the beginning.2 To deal with the possible endogeneity with respect to 
the growth rate, Summers adds it as a separate variable, and finds no 
effect. As a cure for the endogeneity of national saving, he also tries 
instrumental variables.  But  his choice of  instrumental variable, the 
government deficit, guarantees a bad outcome because it is also en- 
dogenous. This Summers himself concludes, precisely on the grounds 
of the maintained external balance hypothesis: governments tend to 
react to current-account imbalances by  varying fiscal (among other) 
policies so as to minimize such imbalances. Feldstein and Horioka used 
instrumental variables that can more plausibly be argued to be exog- 
enous, such as the ratio of the retirement-age population to the working- 
age population. But it turns out that such regressions do little or nothing 
to reduce the coefficient on national  saving^.^ 
I.  I also have found coefficients that are, if  anything, higher later in  the twentieth 
century than earlier (Frankel 1986). and, if anything, higher for industrial countries than 
for LDCs (Dooley, Frankel, and Mathieson 1986). 
2. The latter is the problem in a time series study that when a country that is large in 
world financial markets experiences a fall in savings, there may be an increase in  the 
rate of return to capital and a consequent fall in  domestic investment, not because of 
imperfect capital mobility but because there are (equal) effects on the rate of return and 
investment everywhere in the world. Obstfeld (1986), for example, attributes the finding 
of a high saving-investment correlation for the United States to the large-country effect. 
3. I consider the level of military expenditure, an important determinant of government 
expenditure that is driven primarily by political events, to be another good instrumental 
variable. But using military expenditure and the retirement ratio as  instrumental variables 
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After the best  possible fix-ups are applied, econometric problems 
undoubtedly  still remain. But it seems likely that even genuinely ex- 
ogenous shifts in national savings do not in fact provoke a sufficiently 
large capital inflow to keep the domestic rate of return and investment 
from changing. It is in this sense that the econometric critiques are 
beside the point. 
The condition that we are really interested in testing is that capital 
is  sufficiently mobile to equalize expected real rates of return inter- 
nationally. After all, the only reason one might have for thinking that 
national investment rates would be insulated from domestic disturb- 
ances would be that investment depends on a rate of return that is in 
turn tied  to an exogenous world rate of return. Subject only to the 
quality  of  the data on expected rates of  return, equalization of  the 
returns is a condition that can better be tested directly. Tests of real 
interest rate parity abound; Mishkin (1984) is one example. They all 
tend  to find large and sustained deviations. The observed failure of 
capital movements to equalize rates of return is itself sufficient to negate 
the hypothesis that savings should have no effect on investment, econ- 
ometric problems aside. 
Why are real rates of return not equalized? Imperfect integration of 
financial markets, attributable in the case of LDCs to political risk in 
particular, is certainly one explanation. But even if  political risk and 
exchange risk were unimportant enough that uncovered interest parity 
were to hold well, i.e., even if  financial markets were perfectly inte- 
grated internationally, there would be no reason to expect real interest 
parity to hold. Let us label the domestic real interest rate r = i -  T, 
and the foreign real interest rate r* = i*  - n*,  where i and i* are the 
domestic and foreign nominal interest rates, respectively, and 7~ and 
IT* are the domestic and foreign expected inflation rates, respectively. 
Then the real interest differential can be broken into two components: 
r -  rf  = (i -  i’  -  As‘)  + (Ase - T + T*), 
where Ase, is the expected rate of change of the spot exchange rate. 
It is clear that even if  arbitrage in financial markets were to eliminate 
the first term, i.e., even if uncovered, or “open,”  interest parity were 
to hold, real interest parity  would not hold unless the second term, 
representing expected real depreciation of the currency, were also to 
equal zero.  Expected  real  depreciation is zero if  purchasing  power 
parity holds, but it is well known by now that purchasing power parity 
empirically does not hold, even approximately and even in the relatively 
long run. Thus there is good reason to expect real interest parity to 
fail, and there is in  turn no reason to expect savings and investment 
rates to be uncorrelated, problems of econometric endogeneity aside. 
International portfolio  investors may  have reason to arbitrage away 
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numeraire; but they have no reason to arbitrage away a gap between 
the domestic rate of return expressed in terms of domestic goods and 
the foreign rate of  return  expressed  in  terms  of foreign goods. Put 
differently, crowding out of investment occurs, but the failure of in- 
ternational capital mobility to prevent it may have more to do with the 
imperfect integration of  goods markets than with the imperfect inte- 
gration of financial markets. 
Two qualifications to the purchasing power parity argument can be 
made. First, statements about tax policy such as Summers has in mind 
are often made in a context of comparative-statics public finance. In 
such a context, very long-run measures of expected rates of return, 
which might show purchasing power parity holding, are relevant. But 
if  this is the argument, then a decade, which is the approximate span 
of time over which the cross-section studies typically average the sav- 
ings and investment rates, may not be a long enough run. Expected 
real depreciation of the U.S. dollar has by a variety of measures been 
positive throughout the 1980s. (Furthermore, American businessmen’s 
concerns with competitiveness and the trade balance are not primarily 
concerned with the longer run.) 
Second, it should be noted that proponents of the saving-investment 
approach to measuring capital mobility over the rate of return approach 
often argue that what matters is the less measurable return  on real 
capital, not the more measurable real return on bonds, and that the 
two are not necessarily equal even within a country. But foreign inves- 
tors who purchase equities or undertake direct investment are no more 
likely to evaluate returns in terms of local purchasing power than are 
investors who purchase bonds. On the other hand, it is true that political 
risk, especially in LDCs, has usually been considered a more serious 
barrier to the equalization of  returns  on direct  investment than  on 
bonds, with the implication that the imperfect integration of financial 
markets becomes relatively more  important for LDCs. In short, all 
three factors--expected  real depreciation, political risk, and exchange 
risk-can be relevant in explaining international differences in real rates 
of return. 
The position of the Summers paper is that barriers to international 
capital mobility, such as the three obstacles to real interest rate equal- 
ization just named, are not particularly important. The high observed 
effects of national saving on investment are instead attributed to gov- 
ernment behavior under the maintained external balance hypothesis. 
He ties this conclusion back to the original question of why business- 
men claim that they need tax advantages in order to compete inter- 
nationally. The concluding paragraph offers the novel argument that 
businessmen expect enhanced investment incentives to lead to a wors- 
ening of the current account, which in turn will prompt the government 
to adopt other measures  to move the current account back  toward 380  Lawrence H. Summers 
balance (not, presumably,  including a rollback of the investment in- 
centives!), and that the businessmen who are in tradable-goods indus- 
tries will benefit from these other measures. It seems to  me that a much 
less convoluted way of getting the same result is that a reduction  in 
corporate taxes is directly in the interest of corporations, and that they 
find it useful to cite international competition as their justification.  It 
may  be  rational for businessmen  to try to argue to the public  that 
investment incentives improve the trade balance, just as it is our role 
as economists to point out that investment incentives, whatever their 
other advantages, in fact have no such effect. 
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Comment  Roger H. Gordon 
The declining international  competitiveness of  the United States has 
been of much concern to policy makers. Summers, by analyzing the 
Roger H. Gordon is a professor of economics at the University of Michigan in Ann 
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short- and long-run effects of various policies on international com- 
petitiveness, provides an important public service by making this policy 
debate more informed. 
The key question in  his analysis is the degree to which the U.S. 
economy approximates a small, open economy, where there is no direct 
link between domestic savings and investment. Summers reexamines 
the evidence presented originally by Feldstein and Horioka (1980) that 
domestic savings and investment rates are closely linked statistically, 
and argues that this close link is the result of policy decisions to keep 
them closely linked. 
This argument seems quite plausible. Concern with the current ac- 
count deficit or surplus certainly affects policy decisions both here and 
abroad. The recent pressure in the United States to cut the deficit in 
order to alleviate this trade deficit is only a recent example. How much 
importance to assign to this factor is a more difficult question, however. 
Summers’s statistical evidence must be  interpreted  with  some care 
given the large differences between the deficit as actually  measured 
and the size of public savings as it ought to be measured.* There is no 
reason to expect that the measurement errors will be uncorrelated with 
savings or investment rates. 
Several questions remain,  however, even if  we accept Summers’s 
argument. First, why have governments chosen so consistently to re- 
strict any current account deficit or surplus? Since, given the normal 
vagaries of policy-making, it seems difficult to attribute the close as- 
sociation between savings and investment across many countries and 
over an extended period of time entirely to the use of policy, what else 
may be going on? 
The model that Summers develops in the first part of the paper does 
not really help in answering these questions. As Summers argues, if 
saving increases in a country, “investment  may rise or fall but it is 
unlikely to change a great deal.”  In the next section, he argues that if 
investment increases, then domestic savings should  This model 
therefore cannot help in explaining the close association between saving 
and investment. In addition, within the model, since the country is a 
price  taker in  the international markets, it  is  easily  shown that the 
government cannot improve welfare by distorting decisions made by 
1. However, why policy should be concerned with the size of the traded-goods sector 
of the economy per se on  efficiency or welfare grounds is not clear. 
2. Probably the two largest problems in the measure of the deficit are first the omission 
of the change  in  the implicit debt of  the Social Security and other transfer programs, 
and  second the lack of correction for the effects of inflation on the real value of  out- 
standing debt. See Kotlikoff (1984) for further discussion. 
3. This argument ignores any tax increase necessary to finance the investment incen- 
tives. It is not clear what happens to  savings due to this tax change if a balanced budget 
is required. 382  Lawrence H. Summers 
the private market, so would have no clear reason to seek to restrict 
current account deficits and surpluses-private  decisions are Pareto 
optimal, given internationally set prices. 
However, a simple alternative to this model, which I would like to 
present next, can imply not only a close association between savings 
and investment if  there is no government intervention, even though 
goods flow freely across borders, but also the desirability on welfare 
grounds of  government intervention to further restrict the current ac- 
count deficit or surplus. 
To  keep the story simple, let there be two countries each of  which 
produces a single commodity. The two commodities are not  perfect 
substitutes, and consumers in each country consume both commodi- 
ties. Each consumer has a relative preference for the locally produced 
good. 
In order to explore savings and investment decisions in the home 
country, assume that the world lasts for two periods. Output in the 
foreign country in  period  i is assumed to  be  exogenous and to be 
denoted by  Yi.  Domestic output in the first period is also assumed to 
be exogenous and denoted by XI.  This output can be consumed at 
home, consumed abroad, or invested at home. Only the locally pro- 
duced good is suitable for investment. If S  denotes first-period invest- 
ment in the home country, then second-period resources are assumed 
to equal S  + AS), where f’(.)  > 0 and f”(.) < 0. 
Let Hii (Fii> represent the amount of  the domestic (foreign) good 
produced in period i which is consumed that period in countryj. The 
government is assumed not to use any resources, so that the first-period 
resource constraint implies that S  = H -  Hll - HI2. 
Let U(HI1,  FI1,  H21,  F2J represent the utility of the representative 
domestic consumer, where  U(.)  satisfies the normal properties of  a 
utility function. Let the market prices for these four goods be denoted 
by  (1 + d), P1(l + d),  1, and P2 respectively. If  this individual max- 
imizes utility subject to the given market prices for the four goods, 
then among other conditions it must be the case that: 
(la)  UllU3  = 1  + d, and 
!1b)  f  = d. 
Therefore, investment occurs until the marginal product of capital equals 
the market determined interest factor d, and the marginal time pref- 
erence rate with respect to the domestic good must also reflect this 
interest factor. 
Similarly, let V1(HI2,FI2)  +  pv2(H22,F22)  represent the utility of the 
foreign consumer, where V(.)  also satisfies normal properties of a utility 383  Tax  Policy and International Competitiveness 
f~nction.~  This consumer is subject to the trade balance constraint, 
which requires that 
(2)  (1 + 4Hl2  + H22  = PI(1 +  WI1  + P2  F21. 
Given that FI2  = YI - F1,  and FZ2 =  Y2 -  FZl,  we can solve for util- 
ity maximizing behavior of the foreign consumer subject to the above 
budget constraint, and find for example that 
(3a)  vyvl  = PI, 
(3b)  r/?lv  = P2,  and 
(3c)  VjlV$ = (1 + d)  PI/P2. 
It follows from equation (3a) that PI = p1  (Hl2,FI1),  and from (3b) that 
P2 = p2(HZ2,  F2])  for some functions PI(.)  and p2(.).  Given standard 
assumptions about the utility function, all the first derivatives of these 
functions pi  will be positive. 
One interesting case to explore is when the home country is suffi- 
ciently  small relative to the foreign country that the foreign interest 
rate can be taken to be exogenous. Denote this rate by r. It then follows 
from  equation  (3c)  that  (1  + d)PI/Pz  = 1 + r,  implying  that 
1 + d = Pz(l +  r)/Pl.  Since d represents the home interest rate, this 
result tells us how the amounts traded affect the home interest rate. 
For example, in the context of Summers’s argument, given currently 
high U.S. deficits, current demand for U.S. goods should be relatively 
high and the model, for plausible parameter values, would imply a low 
value of  Conversely, in the second period, when the U.S. debt is 
repaid, demand for U.S. goods is low and so P2  should be high. Together 
these imply that the U.S. interest rate will exceed the foreign interest 
rate r. Since investors will invest in  any project at home earning at 
least the domestic interest rate, we find that the deficit should cause a 
drop in  domestic investment,  and  also, given  equation (la), an in- 
creased incentive to save. Therefore, this model describes how market 
forces can push domestic savings and domestic investment together. 
Assume now that through its tax policy the government can deter- 
mine the consumer’s consumption bundle.  What government  policy 
will maximize the consumer’s utility, taking account of the effect of 
the policy on market prices? 
,Fd 
subject to the domestic resource and the trade balance constraints: 
The objective of the government is to maximize U(H1  I ,Fll, 
4. The superscripts are used primarily to make clear what the arguments of Vare in any 
5. Examples certainly exist, however, with the opposite implication, e.g., when the 
given context and not necessarily to describe differences in tastes between the periods. 
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(4a)  H22 +  H2, = fix - HI,  -  HI2)  +  X - HI, -  HI*,  and 
(4b) 
The first-order conditions with respect to HI2  and H22  together imply 
that 
P2(l + r)  HI2/Pl  + H22 = P2[(1 + r)FII  + F2,]. 
(6) 
Recall that without government intervention$  = d. The extra expres- 
sion in equation (3,  to the extent it differs from one, represents the 
desired intervention by the government. The numerator and denomi- 
nator each take the form of (1 - lk), where E is a price elasticity of 
demand abroad for the domestic output. But this is just the standard 
form for the ratio of the marginal revenue to the price when a monop- 
olist sells in a given market. To  the extent that the price elasticities 
differ in the two periods, the government should push sales towards 
that period where the price elasticity is greater.6 
To explore the implications of equation (5) let us examine two ex- 
amples. Consider first the situation where the foreign consumer’s utility 
function can be expressed as 
U,lU, = 1 + f‘. 
(7)  V(H,2,  Fi2) = (Hj2  + A)-FJ:--’. 
One way to rationalize the extra term A is to argue that there are really 
fewer goods than countries, so that the home country is not the only 
supplier of its particular output. The home country takes as given the 
supply of its good produced elsewhere, denoted by A, when making 
its own decisions.’ The smaller the home country’s share of the market 
for its output, the larger is A relative to Hj2. 
Given this utility function, equation (5) can be reexpressed as 
If  current deficits cause current exports of the domestic good to be a 
relatively small share of the foreign supply of this good, then equation 
(5a) indicates that the marginal product  of  capital should be  raised 
above what would occur without intervention. In other words, given 
the low current rate of savings, there is an incentive for the government 
to raise  the domestic interest  rate  so as  to restrict  investment and 
6. For a related argument on  the use of government policy to exploit monopoly power 
7. It would be interesting but more complicated to explore more sophisticated inter- 
in the international securities market, see Gordon and Varian (1986). 
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encourage savings, pushing the savings and investment rates together.8 
This is just the type of government behavior that Summers argues does 
occur. 
Note in equation (5a)  that if A equals zero, so that the foreign utility 
function is Cobb-Douglas, the equation breaks down. In this case, the 
optimal policy is to sell virtually nothing abroad in each period-given 
the Cobb-Douglas specification, foreigners will spend a fixed fraction 
of their income buying the domestic good, regardless of the available 
supply, so that the optimal supply from the home country’s viewpoint 
is zero. Assuming the foreign consumer’s utility function to be Cobb- 
Douglas is not an innocuous assumption. 
Equation (5a) also implies that when A is larger, perhaps due to the 
home country being smaller, there is less incentive for government 
intervention. This is consistent with the evidence in Summers which 
shows that savings and investment are less closely related in a sample 
of  smaller countries than they are in the OECD countrie~.~  Even if 
there were no important government intervention, if  A is larger then 
the behavior of the home country should have less effect on the size 
of P,  relative to P2  given this utility function, implying that the home 
country’s domestic interest  rate would be  less affected  by  the time 
pattern  of  its  trade  balance.  This  further helps  explain  the  above 
evidence. 
As a second example, assume that the empirical evidence indicates 
that lnH,  = aPi + Zp  for some set of coefficients a and p, and for 
some set of other explanatory variables Z. Given this empirical evi- 
dence, equation (5) can be reexpressed as 
(1 - I/aP,) 
(1 - l/aP,)’ 
l+f’=(I+d) 
In this example, a current deficit should lead to a strong dollar, so a 
relatively small value of PI.  Therefore, equation (5c) implies that the 
government should lower the domestic interest  rate, stimulating in- 
vestment and discouraging savings. This specification implies govern- 
ment behavior contrary to Summers’s argument. 
At least with the first example, this model helps explain why gov- 
ernments may in fact have acted so as to restrict the trade deficit or 
surplus. Given the large budget and trade deficit currently in the United 
States, the model can be used to argue for increased savings incentives 
and perhaps for a cut in the budget deficit. These policies, by raising 
the price of goods produced abroad, would improve the competitive 
8. Given equation (6) however, we see that there is no incentive to cause the value of 
the marginal product of capital to differ from the marginal time preference rate. 
9. Similar evidence on  a weaker association between savings and investment in smaller 
countries is found in Obstfeld (1985). 386  Lawrence H. Summers 
position of domestic firms.  However, the model would argue against 
enacting investment  incentives,  given the budget deficit, and in fact 
would support raising the required rate of return on domestic invest- 
ment in line with the increase in the return to savings, contrary to what 
is advocated by those concerned with international competitiveness. 
The motivation behind  these policies in the model is to prevent the 
price of U.S.-produced  goods from being driven down too far when 
the debt is eventually repaid and the market is flooded with U.S. goods. 
Policies which reduce the build-up in the debt, by increasing savings 
and reducing investment, look attractive within the model. 
This model therefore seems to provide a framework that can ration- 
alize not only the evidence in Feldstein and Horioka (1980) that current 
account deficits and surpluses never become very large but also the 
argument by Summers that governments seem to set policy to further 
restrict these deficits and surpluses. How important government policy 
is relative to market forces in pushing savings and investment rates in 
a country together remains an open question, however. 
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